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Note
SMITH V. DOE: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TOWARDS THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND A BROAD, PUNITIVE
CIVIL LAW BETRAYS THE CORE PRINCIPLES
OF THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
In Smith v. Doe I,' the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) 2 violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution'
by retroactively imposing mandatory registration and notification pro-
visions on sex offenders.4 In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the
provisions of ASORA were both civil and nonpunitive and thus did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.5 Specifically, the Court deter-
mined that the purpose of ASORA is civil because the legislature de-
signed the statute to protect the public from sex offenders.6
Furthermore, the Court found that ASORA's effects were nonpuni-
tive,7 did not impose an affirmative disability,' and were not overly
broad or excessive in light of the statute's stated purpose.9 In so hold-
1. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
2. AiAsKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (2002). The law requires an individual who
has been convicted of a sex offense to register in person with the local law enforcement
authority. Id. § 12.63.010(b). The sex offender must provide the following information:
name, address, place of employment, date of birth, conviction information, aliases, and
driver's license number. Id. § 12.63.010(b)(1)(A). A person convicted of a single sex of-
fense must register annually for fifteen years. Id. § 12.63.020(a) (2). A person convicted of
two or more sex offenses must register annually for the rest of his life. Id.
§ 12.63.020(a)(1). The Act also establishes a "central registry of sex offenders." Id.
§ 18.65.087(a). Information subject to public disclosure includes the sex offender's name,
address, photograph, place of employment, date of birth, crime for which convicted, date
of conviction, place and court of conviction, and length of sentence. Id. § 18.65.087(b).
The Department of Public Safety has published the registry information on its website at
http://www.dps.state.ak.us/nSorcr/asp/.
3. Article I of the Constitution states in relevant part: "No State shall ... pass any...
ex post facto Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
4. Smith, 538 U.S. at 89.
5. Id. at 105.
6. Id. at 92.
7. Id. at 105. The Court rejected Does' argument that ASORA resembles colonial
shaming punishments such as branding or banishment. Id. at 98. Although acknowledg-
ing that ASORA's notification provision may impose a stigma on registrants, the Court
distinguished ASORA from historical shaming punishment by reasoning that publicity of
the registrant's crime was not an integral part of ASORA's regulatory purpose. Id.
8. Id. at 100.
9. Id. at 105.
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ing, the Court failed to require ASORA's provisions to serve the legis-
lature's stated intent of protecting the public from sex offenders.' °
Instead of following its earlier holding in Kansas v. Hendricks," the
Court in Smith upheld an overly broad statute that burdens more peo-
ple than necessary. In so doing, the Court set a precedent that allows
states to enact broad, punitive sex offender registration and notifica-
tion provisions that violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
I. THE CASE
John Doe I and John Doe II were each convicted of sexual abuse
of a minor, an aggravated sexual offense under Alaska law. 2 Doe I
pled nolo contendere to the charge of sexually abusing his daughter over
the course of two years.1" Upon Doe I's release from prison, a court
granted him custody of his daughter after determining that he was
rehabilitated.' 4 Similarly, Doe II pled nolo contendere to the charge of
sexually abusing a fourteen-year-old girl. 5 Doe I and Doe II spent
eight years in prison and were released in 1990.6 In 1994, Alaska
enacted ASORA, which requires convicted sex offenders to register
with local law enforcement authorities.' 7 In addition, ASORA autho-
rizes the public disclosure of information collected in a central regis-
try of sex offenders, which the Department of Public Safety
maintains.' 8
In 1994, Doe I and Doe II, along with Doe I's wife,' 9 filed a com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska."
They asserted that ASORA violated their procedural and substantive
due process rights, their federal constitutional privacy rights, and the
10. See 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41, § 1 (listing the legislative findings behind ASORA).
11. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). In Hendricks, the Court stated that it is necessary to narrowly
tailor a sex offender statute's effects to its civil intent for it to survive an ex post facto chal-
lenge. Id. at 371.
12. Smith, 538 U.S. at 91.
13. Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2001).
14. Id. In deciding to grant Doe I custody of his daughter, the court relied in part on
psychiatric evaluations concluding that Doe I had "a very low risk of reoffending" and was
"not a pedophile." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (2002); see supra note 2 and accompanying
text (discussing ASORA's provisions).
18. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087 (2002).
19. Doe I's wife, a registered nurse, alleged that disclosing her husband's criminal his-
tory would undermine relationships in her professional life, including her ability to ac-
quire and care for patients. Doe I, 259 F.3d at 983.
20. Id. at 995.
[VOL. 63:369
2004] SMITH V. DOE
Ex Post Facto Clause.2 1 In addition, they sought leave to proceed under
pseudonyms, but the court denied this request. 22 Eventually, in 1998,
after the district court granted the Does leave to proceed under
pseudonyms, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.2 1
The district judge granted the State's motion for summary judg-
ment.24 The Does then appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that ASORA violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause.2 5
The Court of Appeals chose not to resolve the case on due pro-
cess grounds. 6 Rather, it based its decision on the narrower issue of
whether ASORA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.2 7 The court used
the two-step "intent-effects test"28 to determine whether ASORA's re-
gistration and notification requirements constituted a punishment in
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 29 After examining the legislative
findings and ASORA's structure, the court found that the intent of
ASORA was to address the public's fear of the high rate of recidivism
among sex offenders."0 Thus, the court concluded that the purpose
of the statute was nonpunitive.3 1 The court then proceeded to the
second step of the test, considering the statute's effect on convicted
21. Id.
22. Id. at 983. The Does appealed this denial to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. Id. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because the district
court had not yet entered a final judgment in the case. Id. On remand from the Court of
Appeals, the district judge dismissed the complaint when the Does would not amend it to
include their real names. Id. The Does then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the district court and held that the Does could proceed under pseudonyms. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 982.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 985 (internal quotation marks omitted). The intent-effects test is a two-step
inquiry used in ex post facto cases to determine if a statute should be classified as punitive.
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). The first level of the test requires a
determination of whether the legislature's intent in enacting the statute was punitive or
civil. Id. If the court determines that the legislature had a civil intent, it proceeds to the
second level, where it inquires whether the statute's provisions are so punitive either in
purpose or effect that the statute should be held punitive. Id. at 249.
29. Doe 1, 259 F.3d at 985.
30. Id. at 986. The Alaska legislature made the following findings:
(1) sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release from custody;
(2) protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary governmental interest;
(3) the privacy interests of persons convicted of sex offenses are less important
than the government's interest in public safety; and
(4) release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the
general public will assist in protecting public safety.
1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41, § 1.
31. Doe 1, 259 F.2d at 986.
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sex offenders. 32 Using the seven factors set forth in Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez,33 the court concluded that ASORA's effects were
punitive.34
The Court of Appeals held that the effects of ASORA's provisions,
as examined under the Mendoza-Martinez factors, provided the "clear-
est proof' that the statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 5 The
court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment
for the State and remanded the case for further proceedings consis-
tent with its decision.
36
The State appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari to determine whether ASORA violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause.3 7 Specifically, the Court considered whether ASORA im-
posed a punitive registration and public notification burden on sex
offenders who had already served prison sentences for their crimes.38
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Constitutional Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws
Article I of the United States Constitution prohibits the states
from passing "any... ex post facto Law."39 The Ex Post Facto Clause
proscribes the enactment of any law that "imposes punishment for an
act that was not punishable at the time it was committed or imposes
additional punishment to that then prescribed."4 ° A law is considered
32. Id.
33. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The seven factors listed in Mendoza-Martinez are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it ap-
plies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
34. Doe I, 259 F.3d at 993-94.
35. Id. at 994. The court found the punitive effects of ASORA's overbreadth to be
exemplified by Doe I's case because a previous court had found him to be successfully
rehabilitated. Id. at 993. The court compared ASORA's lack of regard for actual future
risk to the cases decided by other federal courts of appeal. Id. With only one exception,
each court had upheld only those sex offender registration and notification laws with pro-
visions tailored to the risk posed by the offender. Id. at 992.
36. Id. at 995.
37. Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 91 (2003).
38. Id. at 92.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
40. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
277, 325-26 (1866)).
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ex post facto if it satisfies two criteria.4' First, the law must be retrospec-
tive, that is, "it must apply to events occurring before its enactment. '42
Second, the law must disadvantage the affected offender.4" Addition-
ally, a civil law may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if a court finds that
the law's effect is punitive.44
In addition, the Framers of the Constitution designed the Ex Post
Facto Clause to protect individuals who could be vulnerable to retribu-
tion extending beyond their original sentence, particularly if the pub-
lic sentiment is one of revenge and anger toward a specific offense.45
In such an instance, the Ex Post Facto Clause "restricts governmental
power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." 46
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that it was the Framers' intent
for laws to provide notice of their effects.4 7 Moreover, the Clause en-
sures that a person who is convicted of a crime can depend on her
sentence, rather than fear the risk of future punishment.41
B. Punishment or Civil Penalty-the Deciding Factor
Historically, ex post facto jurisprudence has focused on whether
the challenged civil statutory provision imposes a punishment or a
civil penalty.49 Although laws that impose additional punishment are
prohibited, the Court has found that nonpunitive civil regulations do
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause even if they impose a hardship.5"
Consequently, the Court has drawn a distinction between laws that are
punitive and laws that are civil, even though they may be burden-
41. Id. at 29.
42. Id
43. Id. The classic example of an ex post facto law is a criminal law that illegalizes con-
duct that, when committed, was not a punishable criminal offense. See, e.g., Miller v. Flor-
ida, 482 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1987) (finding unconstitutional a state statute that increased the
sentence for a crime as applied to a defendant who had committed the crime before the
statute's enactment).
44. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (noting that the clearest proof that a
statutory scheme is punitive will transform a civil regulation into a criminal penalty, thus
violating the Ex Post Facto Clause).
45. Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).
46. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898) (holding that removal of one's
right to practice medicine based on a prior conviction is not an additional penalty but
rather a civil regulation of qualifications for physicians to practice medicine).
50. See generally United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 255 (1980) (holding that imposing
a monetary penalty for violating the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is civil); De Veau
v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (holding that the New York Waterfront Commission
Act of 1953, which prohibited a person convicted of a felony from holding office in a
waterfront labor organization, is not punitive).
2004]
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some.5' Yet when evaluating a statute's effect to determine whether it
is civil or punitive, the Court has struggled to define how closely tai-
lored the fit must be between the statute's stated purpose and the
burden it imposes.
The requirement of a close fit between the statutory intent and
actual risk of harm, particularly when a state is exercising its police
power, has not always been present. In Hawker v. New York, 52 the
Court considered the constitutionality of a state law that prohibited
convicted felons from practicing medicine.5" Under this statute, a
physician was indicted for the unlawful practice of medicine because
of his status as a convicted felon.54 Despite the fact that the physi-
cian's disqualifying conviction predated the enactment of the statute
by fifteen years, he was tried, convicted, and fined.55 The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction, determining that the statute was en-
acted pursuant to the State's proper exercise of police power-pro-
tecting the citizens of New York from "physicians of bad character."
56
The Court concluded that a past felony conviction calls into question
a physician's fitness to practice medicine.57 Therefore, the Court held
that the legislation did not constitute an additional penalty,58 and as
such, the Court concluded that the statute did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.59
More than fifty years later, in De Veau v. Braisted,6" the Court again
upheld the use of a past conviction as a bar to employment in a speci-
fied occupation.61 In 1920, a waterfront labor organization employee
pled guilty to a charge of grand larceny.6 2 Thirty-three years later, the
New York Legislature passed the Waterfront Commission Act, prohib-
iting ex-felons from holding office in waterfront labor organizations.63
As a result of the law's passage, the employee was suspended from his
position as the secretary-treasurer of a waterfront labor organization.64
51. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984)
(framing the issue as whether a statute "is intended to be, or by its nature, necessarily is,
criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial").
52. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
53. Id. at 190.
54. Id. at 191.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 196.
57. Id. at 195.
58. Id. at 196.
59. Id. at 200.
60. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
61. Id. at 160.
62. Id. at 145-46.
63. Id. at 146.
64. Id.
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He then filed suit, claiming that his suspension constituted additional
punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.65 To determine
whether the statute was civil or punitive, the Court examined the in-
tent of the legislature, noting that the inquiry turned on whether the
legislative intent was to punish the person for a past activity or to re-
strict the person as a part of a "relevant incident to a regulation of a
present situation."66 The Court accepted the legislature's finding that
the corrupt practices of ex-felons who worked on the waterfront cre-
ated appalling working conditions.67 The Court held that the statute's
prohibition against the employment of ex-felons as officers in water-
front labor organizations was nonpunitive and thus was a valid exer-
cise of the State's police power designed to protect the public's
safety.
6 8
For the first time, in Flemming v. Nestor,6" the Court asserted that a
nonpunitive statute must be aimed at the actual behavior or status
with which the statute is concerned.7 ° The Court considered whether
a provision of the Social Security Act that terminated old-age, survivor,
and disability insurance benefits to aliens deported after September 1,
1954 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.7 In this case, an alien was de-
ported in 1956 for having been a member of the Communist Party
from 1933 to 1939.72 The Court analyzed whether the termination of
benefits was characterized properly as punishment, with the following
premise in mind:
Where the source of legislative concern can be thought to be
the activity or status from which the individual is barred, the
disqualification is not punishment even though it may bear
harshly upon one affected. The contrary is the case where
the statute in question is evidently aimed at the person or
class of persons disqualified.7"
The Court found that the cessation of the alien's benefits was ration-
ally connected to the purpose of the statute. 4 The Court held that
65. Id. at 145.
66. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 157-58.
68. Id. at 158.
69. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
70. Id. at 614 (discussing the balance between the interests of the state's police power
and the individual's rights against punishment for prior conduct).
71. Id. at 613.
72. Id. at 605.
73. Id. at 614.
74. Id. at 617. The Court concluded that Congress was concerned with the termination
of benefits for those persons permanently living outside the country, rather than punishing
persons deported on certain grounds. Id. at 618-19. The petitioner argued that, because
2004]
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the termination of the alien's benefits was not punitive in intent or
effect.75 Thus, the Court concluded that the statute did not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause.76
C. The Development and Evolution of the Supreme Court's Intent-Effects
Test to Determine Whether a Law Violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause
Although the Court's focus on the states' exercise of police power
allowed it to conclude that the regulations at issue in Hawker and De
Veau were civil rather than punitive, the inquiry into statutory intent
has been more difficult for the Court in subsequent cases. 77 As a re-
sult, the Court has developed an analytical framework for determining
whether a law is punitive or civil in the context of ex post facto cases:78
a two-level intent-effects test.79 The first element of the test requires
an examination of the legislature's intent behind the enactment of
the statute at issue.8" Specifically, a court must determine whether the
legislature either expressed or implied a preference for the statute to
be classified as either civil or punitive.8' In making this determina-
tion, a court must examine various factors such as the actual label
Congress did not apply the termination provision to all deportees, Congress punished only
certain acts leading to deportation. Id. at 619. Specifically, Congress did not apply the
termination provision to persons deported on the following grounds: being institutional-
ized due to mental illness, becoming a public charge within five years after entry, failing to
maintain or comply with the conditions of admission as a nonimmigrant, and knowingly
and for gain inducing or aiding another alien to enter the country illegally. Id. at 620 n.13.
75. Id. at 621.
76. Id. The Court recognized that the exercise of police power is an insufficient ratio-
nale to justify the targeting of burdensome civil statutes at a class of people defined by their
past activities. Id. at 614.
77. See, e.g., Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 37-39 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority that the statute, which altered the availability of
"gain time through good conduct" of prisoners convicted before the law, violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Id. at 37. Yet Justice Rehnquist found the case a difficult decision when
considering the opportunities to earn additional gain time afforded by the new statute not
available under the old law. Id. at 37-38.
78. The Court has applied the intent-effects test to cases involving the constitutional
issues of due process, self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and ex post facto laws. See, e.g.,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (applying the intents-effects test to due
process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto law); Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 92-93 (2003)
(applying the intents-effects test to ex post facto law). Thus, when examining whether a
statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court has drawn on precedent from cases
dealing with each of these issues. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 348.
79. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
80. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
81. Id. In most instances, courts defer to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
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given to the provision,8 2 the procedural mechanisms in place for en-
forcing the statute, 3 and whether the statute is located within a state's
criminal or civil code.84 If a court is satisfied that the legislature in-
tended to establish a civil penalty, it proceeds to the second level of
the intent-effects test. The second level requires a court to determine
whether the statute is "so punitive either in purpose or effect" as to
negate the legislature's intent to establish a civil penalty.85 A court
cannot, however, invalidate the legislature's intent without the "clear-
est proof' that the statute is punitive in effect.8 6 To assist courts with
the application of the second level of the intents-effects test, the Su-
preme Court has articulated seven factors that have traditionally been
used to determine whether a law is punitive in effect.8 7
1. The Mendoza-Martinez Factors.-In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marti-
nez,8 8 the Court considered whether a federal law, the Nationality Act
of 1940, violated the Due Process Clause when, without prior court or
administrative proceedings, the law divested a citizen of his American
citizenship because he left the country to evade military service during
wartime." Specifically, the Court examined whether the divestiture of
82. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997) (finding that Congress's in-
tent for a monetary penalty to be civil in nature is evidenced by the statute "expressly
provid[ing] that such penalties are civil") (internal quotation marks omitted); Hendricks,
521 U.S. at 361 (noting that the description of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act as
creating a "civil commitment procedure" indicated the State's intent to create a civil pro-
ceeding) (emphasis omitted); Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (finding that the fact that Congress
had labeled the sanction as a "civil penalty" made it "clear that Congress intended to im-
pose a civil penalty").
83. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103 (finding it significant that the authority to issue sanc-
tions was conferred on an administrative agency); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267,
278 (1996) (finding that procedural mechanisms such as the lack of a notice requirement
and the use of a summary administrative procedure to impose sanction indicated that Con-
gress intended the statutory provision to be civil); United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984) (concluding that Congress designed a forfeiture provi-
sion as a remedial sanction given that the forfeiture provision was to be enforced by an
action in rem).
84. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (concluding that the placement of the Act within
Kansas's probate code rather than its criminal code helped support a finding of civil
intent).
85. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
86. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100 (citation omitted). The clearest proof standard ac-
knowledges the deference generally accorded legislative actions. Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603, 617 (1960). This deference towards legislative decisions prevents a court from
automatically choosing a reading of a statute that results in its invalidation; rather, it re-
quires the clearest proof that the statute is so punitive in effect as to prevail over the legisla-
ture's intent. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
87. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
88. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
89. ld. at 184.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
citizenship imposed an additional penalty for the crime of draft avoid-
ance.9" The Court acknowledged that, in past cases, it was difficult to
determine whether a statute was punitive or regulatory.91 The Court
listed seven factors traditionally used to make this determination:
[1] [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding
of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, [5]
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
[6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable to it, and [7] whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.9 2
In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court concluded that the application of
these factors to the facts of the case demonstrated that the statute was
punitive." After examining the legislative history, however, the Court
found that this additional analysis was unnecessary because Congress
had enacted the statute with the intent to impose further punishment
on those who evaded military service by leaving the country. 4 Thus,
the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it de-
prived individuals of their citizenship without the procedural guaran-
tees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.95
2. The Dilution of the Mendoza-Martinez Factors.-The Mendoza-
Martinez factors do not provide a dispositive test for determining
whether a statute's purpose is punitive.96 Rather, the Court has de-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 168.
92. Id. at 168-69 (emphasis omitted). In subsequent cases, the Court has referred to
and used these factors to determine whether a statute is punitive in effect. See, e.g., United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980) (characterizing the Mendoza-Martinez factors as
"helpful" in the Court's consideration of whether a civil statute's provisions are so punitive
as to transform the regulation into a criminal penalty). Although it identified the factors
as part of the traditional test applied to measure the punitive effect of a regulation, the
Court acknowledged that the factors may not point to the same conclusion in each case.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 165-66. The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person shall be ... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The
Sixth Amendment provides that criminal defendants "shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial,
by an impartialjury... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
96. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (describing the factors as "neither exhaustive nor
dispositive").
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scribed the factors as providing "useful guideposts" for determining
the effect of the statute in question. 97 Later cases illustrate this advi-
sory use of the factors as well as the eventual dilution of specific fac-
tors' significance.
For instance, the Court has diluted the effect of the fifth Mendoza-
Martinez factor, thereby permitting states to enact civil regulations
based on criminal conduct.98 In United States v. Ward,99 the Court con-
sidered whether a civil penalty imposed under the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act was a criminal case within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination.'
The Act required a lessee of an offshore drilling facility to report to
the federal government any discharge of oil or hazardous substances
into navigable waters.'' In addition, the Act imposed a monetary
penalty for any such discharge.1"2 In its application of the intent-ef-
fects test, the Court concluded that Congress's intent was civil because
the sanction was labeled as a "civil penalty."' 3 The Court then ap-
plied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to assess the actual effect of the stat-
ute's provisions."0 4 Although the Court agreed that the behavior to
which the penalty applied-discharging oil or hazardous substances
into navigable waters-was already a crime, the Court found that the
placement of the criminal penalty in one statute and the civil penal-
ties in another statute enacted seventy years later diminished the im-
portance of the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor in its analysis. 5 ' The
Court held that the monetary penalty was civil in nature; therefore,
the reporting requirement did not violate the reporter-violator's right
against compulsory self-incrimination."'
The Court continued to weaken the significance of the fifth Men-
doza-Martinez factor in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms.10 7
In this case, the defendant was charged with dealing firearms without
97. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997).
98. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-50; United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 365 (1984).
99. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
100. Id. at 244.
101. Id. at 244-45.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 249.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 249-50.
106. Id. at 255. The Court has held repeatedly that legislatures "may impose both a
criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission." United States v.
Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996).
107. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
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a license.1 18 During the execution of a search warrant at the defen-
dant's home, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms seized a
cache of firearms."0 9 After a jury subsequently acquitted the defen-
dant, the United States, under the Gun Control Act, pursued an ac-
tion in rem for the forfeiture of the seized firearms.' 0 In its analysis of
the constitutionality of the forfeiture provision, the Court applied the
two-level intent-effects test.11 1 First, the Court determined that the
provision furthered the broad, remedial aim of keeping dangerous
weapons from unlicensed dealers and thus concluded that Congress's
intent was civil in nature.1 12 Second, in its application of the fifth
Mendoza-Martinez factor, the Court found that, although selling fire-
arms without a license was already a crime, precedent allowed Con-
gress to impose both a criminal and a civil sanction for the same
act. 1 3 The Court held that, because the forfeiture mechanism was
not an additional penalty, the provision at issue was not barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause." 4 Thus, the Court continued to diminish
the significance of the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor-whether the
targeted conduct is already a crime.
Similarly, the presence of a deterrent effect is of little import in
the application of the fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor-whether the
act's effect furthers the traditional aims of punishment." 5 In United
States v. Ursery," 6 the Court once again considered whether civil for-
feitures of property were punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause analyses." 7 In Usery, the defendant was convicted
and sentenced to prison for growing marijuana. '" 8 The federal gov-
ernment instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against the defendant's
house.' 9 The Court concluded, as it had in 89Firearms, that the tradi-
108. Id. at 355.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 356.
111. Id. at 363.
112. Id. at 364. The Court also found that Congress's civil intent was clearly demon-
strated by the statute's procedural mechanisms for enforcement. Id. at 363. The enforce-
ment provision incorporated by reference procedures of the Internal Revenue Code that
provided that an action to enforce a forfeiture was a proceeding in ren. Id. Proceedings in
rem traditionally have been viewed as civil proceedings. Id.
113. Id. at 365 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303, 399 U.S. (1938)).
114. Id. at 366.
115. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
116. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
117. Id. at 270.
118. Id. at 272.
119. Id. at 271. The forfeiture proceedings resulted from the use of the house to facili-
tate illegal activities. Id. The police had found marijuana growing adjacent to the house
and discovered marijuana seeds, stems, stalks, and a grow light within the house. Id.
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tional intent of actions in rem was civil. 1 20 After concluding that Con-
gress's intent was to provide a remedial civil sanction, the Court
looked to the provision's effect. 12 1 Specifically, the Court considered
whether the sanctions were "so punitive in form and effect as to
render them criminal despite Congress' [s] intent to the contrary." 122
While acknowledging in its application of the fourth Mendoza-Martinez
factor that civil forfeitures may serve the purpose of deterrence,' 2 3 the
Court concluded that the primary effect of such forfeitures served
nonpunitive ends.124 In so concluding, the Court recognized that "we
long have held that [deterrence] may serve civil as well as criminal
goals. ' 125 Additionally, the Court further minimized the importance
of the fifth factor as it had in Ward and 89 Firearms by finding it to be
inconsequential that the statute was tied to criminal activity. 126 Thus,
the Court held that civil forfeitures do not constitute punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
127
Moreover, the Court's decisions in Hudson v. United States128 rep-
resented a further weakening of the importance of the Mendoza-Marti-
nez factors. The Court considered whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars subsequent criminal prosecution of individuals whom the
government has sanctioned in previous administrative hearings. 129 In
Hudson, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency alleged that
the defendants had violated numerous federal banking statutes.' To
resolve the administrative proceedings, the defendants agreed to be
barred from participating in the affairs of any insured depository insti-
tution. In addition, they agreed to pay monetary penalties. 132 Sub-
sequently, the defendants were indicted on charges stemming from
120. Id. at 278.
121. Id. at 274.
122. Id. at 290.
123. Id. at 292.
124. Id. at 284. Congress's nonpunitive goal in this case was to "confiscate property used
in violation of the law and to require disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct." Id.
Congress also sought to discourage property owners from allowing their property to be
used for illegal purposes, to abate a nuisance, and to ensure that persons do not profit
from their illegal acts. Id. at 290-91.
125. Id. at 292.
126. Id.
127. Id. The Court noted that in rem civil forfeiture historically was not regarded as
punishment and that the government was not required to demonstrate scienter to establish
that the property was subject to forfeiture. Id.
128. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
129. Id. at 95-96.
130. Id. at 96.
131. Id. at 97.
132. Id.
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the earlier allegations, which the administrative hearings had ad-
dressed.1" Applying the first level of the intent-effects test, the Court
found that Congress expressly provided that the penalties were
civil.134 Furthermore, the Court noted that Congress had authorized
administrative agencies to issue debarment orders.135 Accordingly,
the Court turned to the second level of the test and applied the Men-
doza-Martinez factors to determine whether the sanctions were punitive
in effect.' 36 The Court affirmed its conclusion in Ursery; it noted that,
although the imposition of both monetary penalties and debarment
sanctions had a deterring effect, these penalties did not render the
Act punitive. 3 v Moreover, the Court asserted that conduct that trig-
gers a civil regulation may be the subject of a criminal penalty without
first requiring a finding of a punitive intent.' The Court held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the later criminal prosecution
because the administrative proceedings were civil.13 9 Therefore, the
Court slowly moved away from the test it had originally developed in
Kennedy.140
3. The Court Returns Narrow Tailoring to Ex Post Facto Cases.-In
Kansas v. Hendricks,"' the Court addressed a law pertaining to sex of-
fenders.' 42 The Court considered whether civil commitment of a sex
offender following criminal confinement violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause.'43 The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act had specific pro-
cedures that provided for the civil commitment of persons who, due
to a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder," were likely to
engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence."' 44 In this case, the State
133. Id. at 97-98.
134. Id. at 103.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 104.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The Court found that the sanctions did not impose an "affirmative disability or
restraint." Id. at 104. Additionally, the Court noted that monetary penalties and debar-
ment historically were viewed as punishment. Id. Finally, the Court found that scienter
was not required, in the sense that the provisions applied to any person who violated the
statutes, regardless of the violator's state of mind. Id. The Court concluded that a penalty
could be imposed even in the absence of bad faith. Id.
140. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (listing the seven
factors used to determine whether a statute is punitive in purpose or effect).
141. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
142. Id. at 350.
143. Id.
144. Id. As applied to a currently confined person, the statute requires the custodial
agency to notify the local prosecutor sixty days before the anticipated release of a person
who might have met the Act's criteria. Id. at 352. The prosecutor is required to decide
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filed a petition seeking the civil commitment of a convicted sex of-
fender who was scheduled for release after serving ten years in prison
for an offense involving a minor.'4 5 At the civil commitment hearing
required by the statute, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the sex offender currently met the criteria of a sexually violent
predator. 14 6 Consequently, the trial court ordered the sex offender
committed to the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services for
placement in a secure mental health facility. 147
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the intent-effects test and
determined that the intent of the statute was civil.' 4 8 Examining the
legislature's intent, the Court found it to be pertinent that the State
placed the Act in its probate code rather than its criminal code. 149
The Court described the Act as creating a "civil commitment proce-
dure. '1 5 ° Satisfied that the legislative intent was civil, the Court ap-
plied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine whether the "clearest
proof' existed to show that the Act was so punitive in effect as to over-
come the express civil intent of the legislature. 5 First, the Court de-
termined that the statute did not implicate either of the two primary
aims of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence.1 52 Regarding
retribution, the Court focused on the statute's use of past criminal
activity as evidence for determining present or future dangerous-
ness.' 53 Additionally, the Court found that neither a criminal convic-
tion nor a finding of scienter was required.1 54  Instead, the civil
commitment was based on the finding of a current mental abnormal-
ity or personality disorder.' 55  Concerning deterrence, the Court
within forty-five days whether to file a petition in state court seeking the person's involun-
tary civil commitment. Id. If the prosecutor files such a petition, the court is required to
determine whether probable cause exists to support a finding that the person was a "sexu-
ally violent predator." Id. If the court finds probable cause, the individual must undergo a
professional evaluation followed by a trial to determine beyond a reasonable doubt
whether the individual is a sexually violent predator. Id. at 352-53.
145. Id. at 353-54.
146. Id. at 355.
147. Id. at 356. The statute provided that a person who was designated a sexually violent
predator be transferred to the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services for "control,
care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disor-
der has so changed that the person is safe to be at large." Id. at 353 (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 361.
149. Id.
150. Id. (emphasis omitted).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 361-63. The Court concluded that the statute was not retributive because
culpability for prior criminal conduct was not at issue. Id. at 362.
153. Id. at 362.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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noted that, because persons committed under the statute were by defi-
nition unable to control their behavior, such persons were unlikely to
be deterred.
15 6
Because restricting the freedom of the "dangerously mentally ill"
is within the police power of a state, the Court concluded that the law
did not involve an affirmative disability or restraint.1 57 The Court re-
butted the argument that the confinement's indefinite duration indi-
cated punitive intent, noting that the indefinite duration was not
linked to any punitive purpose. 158 The Court stated that the indefi-
nite duration was related to the stated purpose of confinement, which
was to detain the individual until his mental abnormalities no longer
posed a threat to others. 159 Additionally, the Court found that the
provision's procedural safeguards were further evidence of the State's
intent to confine the law's effects to a narrow class of individuals-
those who posed a risk to society. 6 ' The Court held that, because the
statute's penalty was narrowly tailored to its stated intent, the civil
commitment of sexually violent offenders following their criminal
confinement did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
16
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Smith v. Doe I, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and held that ASORA
was not punitive in intent or effect and thus did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.' 62 Writing for the majority,163 Justice Kennedy applied
the two-level intent-effects test to determine whether ASORA was a
civil proceeding and, if so, whether it was punitive in intent or
effect.1 6
4
156. Id. The Court also concluded that the conditions surrounding confinement did
not suggest that the State had a punitive purpose in passing the Act. Id. at 363. The
conditions for committed sex offenders were essentially the same as those of any other
involuntarily committed patient. Id.
157. Id. at 363.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. The safeguards required the State to determine annually beyond a reasonable
doubt that the committed individual continued to satisfy the initial standards for commit-
ment. Id. at 364.
161. Id. at 368. The Court determined that the prerequisite finding of current or future
dangerousness served the intent of the statute to protect the public from persons likely to
reoffend. Id.
162. Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003).
163. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 88.
164. Id. at 92.
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Applying the first level of the test, the majority looked to the legis-
lature's purpose for ASORA and found that the State's expressed pur-
pose to protect the public from dangerous sex offenders was a
legitimate, nonpunitive governmental aim.1 65 The Court rejected the
Does' argument that, because the Alaska Constitution considered pro-
tecting the public to be a goal of criminal administration, ASORA was
punitive."' In addition, the Court found that the formal aspects of
ASORA, such as the location of the registration provision in the
State's criminal procedure code, did not transform ASORA into a
criminal statute.167 The Court noted that in Title 12, where ASORA's
registration provisions were located, the legislature had included
other provisions that did not involve criminal punishment.'68 Finally,
because authority is vested in the Alaska Department of Public Safety
to regulate ASORA's notification and registration provisions, the
Court concluded that the Alaska legislature intended to create a civil,
nonpunitive statute.1
6 1
Turning to the second level of the test, the Court determined
that five of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors were relevant to its anal-
ysis of ASORA. t7 ° First, the Court rejected the Does' argument re-
garding the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the sanction at
issue has historically been considered a punishment. 17' Despite the
Does' contention that ASORA resembled historical shaming punish-
ments used in colonial times, the Court found that sex offender regis-
tration and notification statutes are only a recent legal
development. 172 The Court distinguished ASORA from colonial
shaming punishments by noting that these punishments involved ei-
ther a provision for face-to-face shaming or expulsion from the com-
munity, whereas the humiliation associated with ASORA's public
165. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997)).
166. Id. at 92.
167. Id. at 95-96.
168. Id. at 95. The Court found it logical to provide notice to those subject to ASORA
and concluded that initiating the criminal process to supplement a civil statutory scheme
does not transform the civil statutory scheme into a punitive one. Id. at 96.
169. Id. at 96. But see Kansas, 521 U.S. at 364-65 (finding that the procedural safeguards
demonstrate the legislature's nonpunitive intent to protect the public by confining only
those who are truly dangerous).
170. Smith, 538 U.S. at 96. The Court determined that two of the Mendoza-Martinez fac-
tors, "whether the regulation comes into play only on a finding of scienter" and "whether
the behavior to which [the regulation] applies is already a crime," were not important to
the case because the statute only applied to past criminal conduct. Id. at 105.
171. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
172. Smith, 538 U.S. at 96.
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notification provision was only a collateral consequence of a constitu-
tional regulation.17
Second, the Court found that ASORA did not impose an affirma-
tive restraint or disability.'7 4 The Court observed that ASORA did not
restrain the Does' activities and rejected their argument that ASORA's
notification provision diminished their employability.' 75 Moreover,
the Court noted that the information obtainable through the public
notification provision was also available through criminal background
checks.' 7 6 The Court reasoned that, because the information regard-
ing prior sex offenses was accessible through other means, ASORA did
not impose any additional burden on the Does by providing the infor-
mation to the general public on the internet.1
77
Third, the Court concluded that the presence of a deterrent ef-
fect did not render ASORA punitive. 77 The Court noted that, in
Hudson v. United States, it found that the presence of a deterrent pur-
pose was not enough to render a civil sanction criminal because such
a holding would undermine the government's ability to implement
effective regulations.1 79 The Court further noted its dilution of the
fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor in United States v. Ursery, where it ob-
served its well-established precedent that a civil statute may serve both
civil as well as criminal goals.' Therefore, following the reasoning of
the Hudson and Ursery Courts, the Smith Court concluded that the
presence of a deterrent effect did not, by itself, transform ASORA into
a punitive regulation.1 "'
Considering the sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor, "whether an alter-
native purpose to which [the sanction] may rationally be connected is
assignable to it,"182 the Court rejected the Does' argument that the
statute was overly broad in relation to its stated goal of public safety. 8 3
Analyzing this factor, the Court distinguished Hendricks, where it had
held that, for a statute to survive an ex post facto challenge, the statute's
penalty must be narrowly tailored to its stated purpose.18 4 The Court
focused on the difference between the burdens that the two acts im-
173. Id. at 97-98.
174. Id. at 99-100.
175. Id. at 100.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 101.
178. Id. at 102.
179. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997).
180. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996).
181. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
182. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
183. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03.
184. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997).
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posed-confinement imposed by the act in Hendricks versus registra-
tion imposed by ASORA.' 5 Additionally, the Court concluded that,
rather than permitting ajury to determine an individual's dangerous-
ness, 1 6 it was appropriate in the case of sex offenders to allow the
public to assess the risk of danger based on the information provided
on the registry website.'i 7 The Court found that ASORA was not re-
quired to fit closely or perfectly with its nonpunitive purpose.1 8 8
Thus, the Court concluded that ASORA's failure to provide for a de-
termination of current dangerousness was not evidence of a punitive
purpose. 89
Finally, the Court considered the duration of the reporting re-
quirement and the wide dissemination of information to the public in
its application of the seventh Mendoza-Martinez factor-whether the
sanction seems excessive notwithstanding the alternative purpose to
which it is assigned. 19 ° The Court concluded that the duration of the
reporting requirement was not excessive in light of empirical research
on child molesters, which showed that most reoffenses do not occur
within the first few years after the sex offender is released.19 ' Regard-
ing the wide dissemination of information on the internet, the Court
made two observations.' 9 2 First, the Court noted that the information
available on the internet constituted passive notification, as the public
must seek access to the information by visiting the website. 193 Second,
the Court noted that the mobility of offenders made the wide availa-
bility of the information sensible.' 9 4 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the regulatory means chosen by the Alaska legislature were rea-
sonable in light of ASORA's nonpunitive objective.' 9 5 As such, based
on its application of these five Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Court
held that ASORA's effects did not negate the State's intent to establish
a civil regulation. The Court concluded that ASORA was nonpunitive
and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.19 6
185. Smith, 538 U.S. at 104.
186. This determination is required by the civil commitment statute in Hendricks. 521
U.S. at 352-53.
187. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03.
188. Id. at 103.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 103.
191. Id. at 104.
192. Id. at 105.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 105.
196. Id. at 105-06.
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Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion to reiterate his view
expressed in Selig v. Young,197 that an implementation-based challenge
is out of place in ex post facto jurisprudence. l9 8 Justice Thomas, there-
fore, would not have considered whether the placement of the infor-
mation on the internet renders ASORA punitive because internet
notification was not required by ASORA.' 99
In a separate opinion, in which he concurred in the Court's judg-
ment, Justice Souter noted that, based on the evidence presented,
ASORA could be considered either civil or punitive. 20 0 Justice Souter
stated that the clearest proof standard is appropriate only when appli-
cation of the first level of the intent-effects test clearly reveals that the
legislature's intent is civil. 20 1 In this case, Justice Souter noted that
ASORA did not designate the provisions as being clearly civil in con-
trast to the statutes at issue in past cases.20 2 Considering the effect of
ASORA, Justice Souter observed the public's harsh treatment of sex
offenders.20 3 With this observation in mind, he questioned the civil
nature of the statute.20 4 Specifically, he questioned ASORA's use of
205
an individual's criminal history as the statute's trigger. He was con
cerned that ASORA's construction would result in its overinclusive ap-
plication to individuals who did not pose any threat to the
community. 206 Ultimately, Justice Souter agreed with the judgment
because of "the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded to
a State's law." 20 7
In his dissent, Justice Stevens contended that the central issue in
Smith involved substantive due process rather than the Ex Post Facto
Clause.20 ' He opined that ASORA imposed a significant restraint on
197. 531 U.S. 250, 273 (2001). In Selig, the majority held that an act that is found civil
cannot also be punitive as applied to an individual. Id. at 267. Therefore, the Court re-
jected a prisoner's argument that Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990,
which authorized civil commitment of sexually violent predators, was punitive as applied
because of the conditions of his confinement. Id. at 263.
198. Smith, 538 U.S. at 106 (Thomas, J., concurring).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 107.
204. Id. at 109.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 108-09.
207. Id. at 110.
208. Id.
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the Does' liberty interests. 20 9 Furthermore, Justice Stevens took issue
with the majority's ex post facto jurisprudence. 210 He noted that, in ex
post facto cases where acts were held nonpunitive, conviction of a crime
was not a necessary condition to impose the statute's burden.2 11 Jus-
tice Stevens concluded that because ASORA imposes its requirements
on any individual who commits a criminal sex offense, but not on any-
one else, the act was punitive.212 Additionally, because ASORA im-
paired a registrant's liberty interest, Justice Stevens concluded that
ASORA imposed punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause.2 '3
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg echoed Justice Stevens's view
that, because it was unclear whether the legislature intended ASORA
to be civil or punitive, the clearest proof standard should not be ap-
plied. Instead, she neutrally evaluated the purpose and effects of
ASORA. 2 14 In her application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, Justice
Ginsburg found ASORA punitive in effect.2 15 Justice Ginsburg un-
equivocally determined that ASORA imposed an affirmative restraint
and disability-the first Mendoza-Martinez factor. 216 She found its re-
porting obligations to be "onerous and intrusive" and its notification
provision to expose registrants "to profound humiliation and commu-
nity-wide ostracism." 217  In addition, Justice Ginsburg considered
ASORA's registration and reporting provisions to be comparable to
the conditions of supervised release or parole and ASORA's public
notification provision similar to historical shaming punishments.21 8
In her application of the fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor, Justice Gins-
burg concluded that ASORA's retributive aim was demonstrated by
the statute's only trigger-prior criminal convictions. 219
209. Id. at 110-11 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens found that ASORA imposed
considerable affirmative obligations as well as a severe stigma on each person to whom
ASORA applied. Id.
210. Id. at 111.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 113.
213. Id. Justice Breyerjoined in the dissent. Id.
214. Id. at 115 (GinsburgJ. dissenting).
215. Id.
216. Id. Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Ninth Circuit's finding that ASORA imposed
an affirmative disability by subjecting offenders to burdensome conditions that are similar
to probation or parole. Id.
217. Id. at 116.
218. Id. Regarding the shaming nature of the public notification provision, Justice Gins-
burg noted that the registrant's face is posted on a webpage under the label "Registered
Sex Offender." Id. at 118.
219. Id.
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While acknowledging that the Court had held some laws to be
civil regulations despite their burdensome provisions, Justice Gins-
burg found ASORA so excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose
as to render the statute punitive. 22' Because ASORA lacked both a
requisite finding of future dangerousness and a relationship between
the duration of the reporting requirement and the risk of reoffense,
Justice Ginsburg determined that ASORA was overinclusive because it
applied to sex offenders who no longer posed a threat to the commu-
nity.22 ' The dispositive factor for Justice Ginsburg was the lack of a
provision in ASORA that could account for the possibility of rehabili-
tation or physical incapacitation of a sex offender. 222 Thus, after find-
ing that ASORA had an ambiguous intent and a punitive effect,
Justice Ginsburg concluded that ASORA violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause.223
IV. ANALYSIS
In Smith v. Doe I, the Supreme Court held that the registration
and notification provisions of ASORA were civil and nonpunitive in
both intent and effect and concluded that ASORA did not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause. 224 Although the Court applied the two-level in-
tent-effects test traditionally used in ex post facto cases to ASORA to
determine whether the sex offender registration and notification pro-
visions were punitive, the Court ultimately deferred to the legislature
in its application of each factor.225 The Court found that the effects
of ASORA's provisions were not so overly burdensome as to negate
the State's intent to establish a civil regulation. 2 6 In so concluding,
the Court abandoned the workable standard it had set forth in Kansas
v. Hendricks and removed from the protection of the Ex Post Facto
Clause a class of persons whom the clause was intended to protect.
227
Rather than require the provisions to be tailored to the purpose of the
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 105-06.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (noting that the Ex Post Facto Clause
"restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legisla-
tion"). Sex offenders have been the object of community outrage and vigilante retribu-
tion; therefore, they are easy targets for "vindictive legislation" passed by legislators eager
to please an angry and fearful public. See Michelle Pia Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for
Post-Sentence Sex Offender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's
"Right" to Know, 48 VAND. L. REv. 219, 220-31 (1995).
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statute, the Smith Court asserted that a law's provisions need not
closely fit the nonpunitive goals the legislature desires to advance. 229
Specifically, the majority failed to require the State to provide for a
finding of dangerousness before subjecting prior offenders to the stat-
ute's burdensome registration and notification provisions. 230 The ma-
jority justified its departure by focusing on the degree of the burden
imposed by ASORA, a distinction not made in prior ex post facto
cases. 23' By failing to require ASORA's provisions to serve the stat-
ute's stated intent, the Court set a precedent that allows states to enact
broad, punitive measures that violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
A. Evaluating the Constitutionality of ASORA Required a Higher
Level of Scrutiny than the Court Applied
1. ASORA Warranted Less Deference Because the Legislative Intent was
Ambiguous.-Rather than deferring to the legislature and marginaliz-
ing the effect of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Court should have
used the factors to determine whether the provisions of the statute
actually serve the expressed intent of the legislature. First, because
the legislature's intent was ambiguous, rather than express, ASORA
warranted less deference. 23 2 In cases where the Court has required
the clearest proof that a statute is punitive in effect, the Court has
found that the legislature unambiguously stated that its intent was
civil. 2 "3 For example, the Ward Court determined that labeling a sanc-
tion as "civil" indicated the express civil intent of the legislature.234 In
Ward, Congress labeled the sanction in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act as a civil penalty, whereas it labeled other sanctions in the
same statute as criminal penalties. 2 5 In contrast, the intent of the
Alaska legislature was not as apparent. 2 6 ASORA does not expressly
228. In Hendricks, the Court held that because a statute's penalty was narrowly tailored
to its stated intent, it did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
229. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 104 (referring to ASORA's provision as being the "more minor condition of
registration" as compared to the civil confinement imposed by the statute in Hendricks).
232. See id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding that ASORA's intent was
ambiguous).
233. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
234. Id.; see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997) (finding that Congress
expressly provided that the penalties were civil and thus the statute's intent clearly was
civil); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (finding that the statute described the
regulatory provision as a civil commitment procedure).
235. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
236. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 108 (Souter, J., concurring) (concluding that ASORA's intent
is unclear because the legislature failed to label the provisions civil).
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refer to the obligations imposed as civil. 23 7 Additionally, the location
of ASORA's registration requirements in Alaska's criminal code sug-
gests that the legislature did not intend to create a purely civil stat-
ute.238 Moreover, the Court contradicted itself when it found that the
lack of procedural safeguards in ASORA indicated a nonpunitive in-
tent.23 9 In Hendricks, the Court had concluded that the inclusion of
procedural safeguards demonstrated the legislature's intent to limit
the application of the statute to persons who posed an actual danger
to society. 240 This limit on the statute's application supported the leg-
islature's stated intent to protect society from dangerous people.24 1
The lack of such safeguards in ASORA, conversely, allows the Act to
apply to persons who are not sexual predators.242 Therefore, because
the legislature did not clearly express a civil intent, the Court should
have afforded the legislature less deference in its application of the
Mendoza-Martinez factors.243
Justice Ginsburg took this approach in her dissent. Rather than
require the clearest proof that the statute was punitive in effect, Jus-
tice Ginsburg applied a more neutral standard. 24 4 Based on her appli-
cation of the factors, Justice Ginsburg concluded that ASORA's
provisions were so punitive in effect as to overcome the legislature's
ambiguous intent.24 5 The majority should have used this approach to
ensure that ASORA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. When a
legislature enacts a statute that imposes a significant burden on an
unpopular class of people, the Court must closely examine whether
the legislature acted with nonpunitive aims or sought to satisfy a com-
munity's feelings of revenge, outrage, and fear.246 Thus, the Court
should have given the Alaska legislature less deference and used Gins-
burg's more neutral standard to determine whether ASORA's effect
was punitive or civil.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 96 (reasoning that ASORA's lack of procedural safeguards implies that the
legislature intended the Act to be civil in nature).
240. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 364 (1997).
241. Id.
242. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (contending that because
ASORA applies to all convicted sex offenders regardless of future dangerousness, the Act's
scope exceeds its purpose).
243. Id. at 95 (noting that some of ASORA's provisions relate to criminal
administration).
244. Id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
245. Id.
246. See id. at 108-09 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter called it "naive" for the
majority to look no further than the legislature's safety objective given society's attitude
towards sex offenders. Id.
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2. The Court's Deferential Application of the Mendoza-Martinez Fac-
tors Caused It to Ignore ASORA's Incongruity with the Ex Post
Facto Clause.-Rather than hold ASORA to constitutional standards,
the majority's application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors ignores
ASORA's subtle incongruities with the Ex Post Facto Clause. The ma-
jority deferred to the legislature's decision in every regard, even when
the resulting provision had no relation to ASORA's purpose and
therefore did not serve its supposed civil intent. For example, when
applying the first factor, "[w] hether the sanction involves an affirma-
tive disability or restraint," the majority concluded that ASORA did
not impose an affirmative disability because the registrants were not
unemployable as a consequence of the public notification provi-
sion.24 7 The Court noted that if an employer wanted to, he could
learn of a registrant's offense through a routine criminal background
check.24 8 This observation ignores the heart of the issue regarding
the notification provision and employability: the potential loss of cus-
tomers when the public becomes aware that sex offenders work at a
particular place of business.2 4 The fear of losing customers would
likely result in businesses refusing to hire those identified on the regis-
try.2 5 Thus, it was irrelevant that information in the sex offender reg-
istry already was available to potential employers. It is the ease with
which the public is able to access this information that negatively im-
pacts a registrant's employability and thus imposes an affirmative
disability.
Additionally, the Court glossed over two of the Mendoza-Martinez
factors that deserved further examination.2 5 First, the Court con-
cluded that the third factor, whether the regulation is activated only
247. Id. at 115-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority ignored the
issues relevant to three of the Mendoza-Martinez factors: whether the sanction involves an
affirmative disability or restraint, whether the regulation is triggered by scienter alone, and
whether the behavior addressed is already a crime).
248. Id. at 99.
249. Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). The court highlighted that the
breadth of ASORA's effect likely would render the plaintiffs "completely unemployable" be-
cause an employer would not want to risk losing business should the public find out that
the employer hired a sex offender. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 105 (reasoning that scienter and the acts targeted by the
statute were not important to this case). But see Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a
Principled Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1711, 1722
(1996) (concluding that the "scienter" factor is "patently inapplicable to sex offender laws"
because scienter is "ambiguous in the context of sex offender statutes ... because although
the sex offender laws themselves do not require criminal culpability, they apply only to
individuals who have been found criminally culpable for sexual misconduct").
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after finding scienter, did not apply to ASORA.25 2 ASORA applies
only to those convicted of a sex offense;253 thus, it applies only to
those offenders found to have scienter. However, the proposed civil
intent of ASORA is to protect society from repeat sex offenders.254 By
allowing scienter alone to trigger the provision, ASORA provides no
protection to society from those persons who may have committed a
sex offense but were not convicted criminally because of their lack of
21scienter. 5 Most importantly, the requirement of scienter gives the
impression that ASORA "retributively targets past guilt."256 Dismissing
the application of this Mendoza-Martinez factor prevented the Court
from reaching the conclusion that a statute triggered by scienter can-
not have a civil intent.
257
In past cases, the Court has minimized the importance of the fifth
factor, whether the behavior addressed in the statute is already a
258 2oucrime.  The Court did, however, examine this factor in Hendricks.259
The Hendricks Court found that the use of past criminal activity did
not indicate a punitive effect because past criminal activity was used as
evidence in determining present or future dangerousness. 260 This ra-
tionale conflicts with the use of past criminal activity in ASORA, as
past criminal activity is the sole trigger for ASORA's provisions.2 61
The Alaska legislature's treatment of criminal activity ought to have
signaled to the Court that it needed to consider the ex post facto impli-
cations presented by the statute as a whole. Nonetheless, the Smith
Court dismissed the implications of ASORA's reliance on past crimi-
nal activity.26 2 The majority's deferential application of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors allowed the Court to conclude that, despite ASORA's
252. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105.
253. Id. at 90.
254. Id. at 93.
255. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997) (noting that the application of
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act to persons absolved of criminal responsibility as
well as to those convicted of a sex offense serves the Act's purpose of protecting the public
from repeat sex offenders).
256. Smith, 538 U.S. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
257. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362 (observing that "[t]he existence of a scienter require-
ment is customarily an important element in distinguishing criminal from civil statutes").
258. See supra notes 99-114 (discussing the diminishing importance of the fifth Mendoza-
Martinez factor in cases involving ex post facto claims).
259. 521 U.S. at 362.
260. Id.
261. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (2002) (pertaining to individuals con-
victed of sex offenses).
262. Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 104 (2003).
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incongruities with the Ex Post Facto Clause, the statute does not violate
the Constitution.2 63
B. The Court Failed to Follow Its Holding in Hendricks Where It
Required the Statute's Provisions to be Tailored to
the Statute's Stated Intent
1. The Majority Focused on the Nature of Burden Alone Rather than
Comparing the Burden to the Statute's Civil Intent.-The majority justified
its departure from Hendricks by focusing on the difference in burdens
imposed by the two statutes. 2 64 The Court observed that the objective
of the statute in Hendricks was the involuntary confinement of danger-
ous individuals, whereas ASORA imposes the less severe condition of a
registration requirement.26 5 The threat of indefinite confinement in
Hendricks caused the Court to examine closely the Act's effects as com-
pared to its civil intent.26 6 The Smith Court was, however, less con-
cerned with the burden ASORA imposed and thus used a more
ambiguous and less protective standard-that which is reasonable in
light of the statute's nonpunitive objective. 26 7 The Court mistakenly
compared the burdens imposed in two different statutes rather than
comparing the burden of ASORA with the Alaska legislature's civil
intent. Ex post facto jurisprudence is not concerned with degrees of
burden per se.268 Rather, it requires courts to examine the burden as it
applies to those individuals affected by the statute in comparison with
the statute's proposed civil purpose.2 69 Therefore, the issue should be
whether the burden inflicted by the statute has an effect beyond its
civil purpose, regardless of the degree of the burden.2 7 ° This stan-
dard was announced by the Court in Hendricks and should have been
applied in Smith. Accordingly, the Court's failure to apply this stan-
dard in Smith represented a departure from its holding in Hendricks.
This departure sets a precedent which allows states to convict persons
of crimes and, at a later time, impose punitive regulations that violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause.
263. Id. at 105.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-59 (1997).
267. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105.
268. See Simeon Schopf, "Megan's Law": Community Notification and the Constitution, 29
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 117, 134 (1995) (noting that the proper constitutional issue is
not the degree of burden on the defendant but whether the burden increases the punish-
ment for the crime).
269. Id.
270. Id.
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2. The Court Failed to Address ASORA's Underinclusive Nature.-In
Smith, the Court did not follow its holding in Hendricks when it allowed
the State to impose a burden on ASORA's registrants that fails to
reach certain individuals who may pose the danger that ASORA at-
tempts to regulate.27 1 First, ASORA does not require the registration
of all individuals who may be sexual predators.272 For example,
ASORA does not impose requirements on individuals who have com-
mitted a sexual offense but were not convicted because they were in-
competent to stand trial. 273 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent,
ASORA departs from the statutes examined in Hendricks and Hawker
in that ASORA's sanctions are triggered solely by criminal convic-
tions.27 4 For example, in Hawker, although a physician was barred
from practicing medicine as a result of a past felony conviction, hypo-
thetically, a physician could be barred from the practice of medicine
because he or she was deemed no longer competent. 275 Likewise, the
burden of civil commitment imposed in Hendricks applied not only to
those convicted of a sex offense, but also to those found not guilty of a
sex offense but are nonetheless dangerous to others.2 76 The fact that
ASORA's provisions are triggered by criminal activity does not alone
make ASORA punitive. However, the fact that its provisions are only
triggered by criminal activity indicates a retributive and punitive pur-
pose.2 77 Therefore, the majority should have required that such an
act apply to all those who posed a risk of reoffense in order for the act
to be deemed civil in effect.
3. The Court Failed to Correct ASORA's Overinclusive Effect Thereby
Burdening More Persons than Necessary to Serve the Statute's Civil Intent.-
Moreover, while restricting the imposition of the burden to only con-
victed sex offenders, ASORA affects more people than necessary to
serve the civil intent. The Alaska legislature acted on the premise that
all persons convicted of a sex offense pose a future danger to soci-
271. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
272. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 90. ASORA applies only to those actually convicted of a sex
offense. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 112 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 113.
276. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352 (1997). In addition to applying to those
convicted of a sexually violent offense, the Kansas Act applied to persons who had been
charged with a sexual offense but had been found incompetent to stand trial, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or not guilty because of a mental disease or defect. Id.
277. See id. at 362 (noting that under the Kansas Act, a criminal conviction is not a
prerequisite for commitment and persons absolved of criminal responsibility may still be
confined, suggesting that the statute does not punish for past misdeeds).
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ety.27 8 The Court allowed the State to rely on statistics that described
the risk of reoffense among sex offenders. 27 9 But, it ignored other
studies that found that the risk of reoffense may not be as high as what
is commonly believed. 2 0 The Court also ignored the possibility of
rehabilitation, exemplified by Doe I in the instant case. 2 1 The com-
mitment statute in Hendricks acknowledged the possibility of rehabili-
tation by requiring a yearly evaluation to determine if a confinee still
posed a danger.28 2 The Court ignored the lack of a similar provision
in ASORA, again allowing the provisions to have a broader effect than
necessary to achieve ASORA's purpose. 28 3  By allowing ASORA to
reach beyond those who pose a danger, the majority again set a prece-
dent for the broad application of punitive regulations which do not
serve a civil intent and thus violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
4. The Court Allowed the Legislature to Delegate Its Role to the General
Public.-Rather than requiring a provision for individual determina-
tions of dangerousness, the majority allowed the State to delegate to
the pubic the duty to assess the risk based on accurate, public informa-
tion regarding the registrants' past convictions. 28 4 However, the infor-
mation provided to the public via the notification provision is not
complete because it includes nothing about an offender's rehabilita-
tion or treatment, which could mitigate the risk of reoffense.28 5 Addi-
tionally, the general public is not equipped or trained to assess the
risk that convicted sex offenders pose. 286 The Court should not allow
states to delegate this responsibility to the general public. 287 In Hen-
278. See 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41, § 1 (stating the legislature's finding that sex offend-
ers have a high rate of recidivism following their release from custody).
279. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03.
280. Jerusalem, supra note 227, at 220-31. Sex offenders are thought to have the highest
rates of recidivism. Id. True rates of recidivism are, however, difficult to ascertain. Id.
Statistics on sex offender recidivism rates are inconsistent. Id. For example, studies have
shown recidivism rates as low as 20% and as high as 80%. Id.
281. Smith, 538 U.S. at 117 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
282. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364.
283. Smith, 538 U.S. at 117 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
284. Id. at 104.
285. See ALA.sKA STAT. § 18.65.087(b) (2002). Information available to the public on the
internet through Alaska's Central Registry includes the sex offender's name, address, pho-
tograph, place of employment, date of birth, crime for which convicted, date of conviction,
place and court of conviction, and length of sentence. Id.
286. See Colleen Miles, Note, Just Desserts, or a Rotten Apple ? Will the Ninth Circuit's Decision
in Doe v. Otte Stand to Ensure that Convicted Sex Offenders are Not Excessively Punished?, 32
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 45, 79 (2002) (arguing that the burden of protection should fall
on law enforcement officials by imposing a period of supervised probation of released sex
offenders).
287. Id.
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dricks, for example, the legislature required a professional evaluation
and then a judicial ruling on whether a person presented a danger to
the public.2 88 In this way, Kansas ensured that the decision to impose
a burden on an individual was based on the actual risk of harm rather
than the fears of the general public.2 8 9
C. The Court Ignored the Purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause and
Abandoned a Workable Standard for Use in
Ex Post Facto Cases
The Court's approach in Smith ignores the goal of ex post facto
jurisprudence-to determine whether the intent of the legislature is
"to punish [the] individual for past activity," or to restrict the individ-
ual pursuant to "a regulation of a present situation."2 9 When a state is
allowed to enact a law that imposes burdens based only on an individ-
ual's past activity rather than on his or her current situation, the law
should be deemed punitive and unconstitutional.2 9 ' Otherwise, states
may impose further punishment under the guise of civil regulation. 9 2
Retroactive punishment by states disguised as civil regulation is partic-
ularly hazardous in cases involving persons convicted of crimes that
have raised the public ire. 293
288. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1997). Before civil commitment was
imposed on a sex offender, the Kansas Act required the individual to have a professional
evaluation and a trial to determine whether the individual was a sexually violent offender.
Id. Additionally, once a sex offender was committed, the Act required the committing
court to conduct an annual review to determine whether the person was still a danger to
society. Id. at 353.
289. Id. at 358.
290. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 108-09 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter
was wary of the use of past crime as the trigger for ASORA's application, particularly when
taking into account the "pervasive attitudes toward sex offenders." Id. at 109.
The fact that the Act uses past crime as the touchstone... serves to feed suspicion
that something more than regulation of safety is going on; when a legislature uses
prior convictions to impose burdens that outpace the law's stated civil aims, there
is room for serious argument that the ulterior purpose is to revisit past crimes,
not prevent future ones.
Id.
293. See generally Jerusalem, supra note 227 (offering a critique of current sex offender
laws and suggesting as an alternative a nationwide registration system combined with mea-
sures for rehabilitation). Categories of crimes such as sex offenses are particularly vulnera-
ble to unconstitutional, ongoing retribution by a state. Id at 228. As a result of highly
publicized and tragic attacks on children by convicted sex offenders, an angry public has
demanded legislatures to respond. Id. Legislators receive pressure from their constituents
to enact laws that cover all sex offenders, regardless of the offender's actual risk to the
community and regardless of the burden placed on the offender. Id at 233. These sex
offender laws have led to damaging consequences for some registrants. See Doe I v. Otte,
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The Smith Court has set a precedent that allows states to enact
punitive laws that violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. First, the Court al-
lowed the State to direct ASORA's burden towards a class of individu-
als-convicted sex offenders-rather than towards ASORA's civil
concern-the protection of its citizens from those likely to commit sex
offenses.294 In its analysis, the Court ignored its holding in Flemming
v. Nestor, where the Court observed that a statute is punitive if it is
directed at a class of persons rather than at the actual activity that the
legislature intends to regulate.295
As the Court concluded in Flemming, targeting a class of individu-
als places a statute outside the realm of civil regulation. 296 The con-
cern in Flemming was whether Congress imposed retroactive
punishment on a class of individuals-members of the Communist
party-under the guise of civil regulation of deportees. 297 The Court
concluded that the burden imposed by the regulation bore a rational
connection to the purpose of the statute. 2 "s The Court found that the
legislature's concern was deportation itself rather than the status that
led to deportation. 99 In contrast, ASORA applies to a class of per-
sons-those who have been convicted of sex offenses-regardless of
whether they actually pose a current danger of committing a sex of-
fense.300 As the Court observed in Flemming, aiming legislation at a
class of people rather than at a specific legislative concern is not a
regulatory action.' ° t Legislation is not punitive, however, if the provi-
sions are necessary to effectuate the civil intent of the legislature.30 2
Because regulating sex offenders as a class was not necessary to serve
ASORA's civil purpose, ASORA could not be considered a regulatory
action. Moreover, the Smith Court's decision ignored both Flemming
and the spirit of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
259 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2001) (recounting evidence that one sex offender subject to
ASORA suffered community hostility and damage to his business after printouts from the
registration website were distributed publicly and posted on bulletin boards).
294. Smith, 538 U.S. at 104.
295. 363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 613.
298. Id. at 617.
299. Id. at 618-19.
300. Smith v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 116-17 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
301. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 614.
302. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Smith v. Doe I, the Supreme Court held that ASORA's registra-
tion and notification provisions were punitive in neither purpose nor
effect and, therefore, concluded that ASORA did not violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. 3 In so holding, the Court failed to require
ASORA's provisions to serve the legislature's stated intent and thus
departed from its decision in Hendricks. °4 The Smith Court should
have found the legislature's intent to be ambiguous and applied the
Mendoza-Martinez factors with less deference. Such an application
would have been consistent with Hendricks. Because of ASORA's lack
of a present dangerousness requirement.. 5 and its burdensome effect
on registrants, the Court should have found that ASORA was punitive.
This holding would have provided a standard by which state legisla-
tures could enact regulatory provisions tailored to their intent while
protecting those convicted of related crimes from retroactive
punishment.
DANA L. MCDONALD
303. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06.
304. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997) (holding that because the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act was narrowly tailored to its stated intent, the act did not
iolate the Ex Post Facto Clause).
305. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that ASORA lacks a
future dangerousness requirement).
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